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Abstract 
Against the background of the era of economic austerity, this chapter presents case study 
evidence showing how efforts to promote project management at a British local authority 
rely on the work of freelance consultants. Inspired by Foucauldian scholarship, we conceive 
the expertise of project management as a technology of governmental power, commenting 
on the practices and identities of the consultants. We show them to be advocates of their own 
distinctive understandings and ways of enacting project expertise, whilst also showing how 
certain forms of tactical yet limited ‘resistance’ are defined by the key targets of their 
intervention: local government workers. The broader implications and dangers of project 
management for democracy in local government in the UK are considered. 
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Introduction  
The deployment of project management (PM) expertise in UK local government, and the 
public sector more generally, has been widely noted. The ‘corporate professions’ of 
management consultancy and PM, or the ‘consultocracy’ (Hodge and Bowman, 2006), critics 
argue (Kipping et al., 2006; Hodgson, 2007; Muzio et al., 2011), have prioritised 
‘marketisation strategies’ to inculcate this professional knowledge base in the UK public 
sector. Hodgson (2007) likewise argues that PM has emerged through a more general demand 
for ‘responsive’ and efficient organisational structures, financial accountability, fixed-term 
contracts and private-public partnerships, especially in ICT service provision.  PM thus 
represents not only a form of knowledge and practice by which managers and consultants are 
expanding their influence in the public sector (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), but also a key 
form of market-led and state endorsed knowledge and practice that neatly aligns with more 
centralised political aims.   
 
This chapter sets the experience of a UK local authority, given the pseudonym here of 
‘Northern County’, in a field of power relations amidst the politics of economic austerity in 
the 2010s. We examine the efforts of political actors and diverse ‘governmental’ authorities 
(Foucault, 1982; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999) to normalise PM knowledge and practice as a 
solution to the struggles of local government. Drawing on data derived from a participant 
observation study conducted during 2011 and 2012, supplemented by interviews and access 
to relevant local authority documents and reports, we illustrate how attempts to encourage 
PM are reliant on the work of freelance consultants of PM expertise. As agents of 
projectification, these subjects were contracted project managers (PM) with significant 
experience in ICT transformational change and management consultancy in both private and 
public sectors. Crucial to a council wide programme for enhancing PM expertise across this 
 
  
local authority, we comment on the identities and practices of five freelance PM consultants, 
showing them to be advocates of their own distinctive understandings and ways of enacting 
PM expertise. We go on to address the consequences and effects of this programme, 
illustrating how certain forms of tactical yet limited ‘resistance’ are defined by the key targets 
of this intervention; local government workers increasingly involved in project work at the 
local authority.  
 
Inspired by Foucauldian scholarship (Dean, 1999; Munro, 2012) we go on to argue that PM 
knowledge and practice constitutes an exemplary technology of ‘governmental’ power; an 
inconspicuous bundle of concepts, techniques and professional competencies that aims to 
effect control ‘at a distance’ (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999; Munro, 2012). We reflect on the  
diverse programmatic objectives and ambiguities at play in the messy implementation of this 
particular scheme of rule (McKinlay et al., 2012). In doing so the implications and dangers 
for democracy in local government in the UK are addressed (Du Gay, 2000; Du Gay, 2008; 
Newman, 2014). We begin, however, with an account of the course of change at the local 
authority and the role that PM was intended to play in that process. 
  
The case of ‘Northern County’ – an introduction 
Since the early 1980s local government in the UK has been subject to a series of political and 
economic reforms intended to make it more receptive to the requirements of central 
government (Forsyth, 1980; Miller, 2005; Newman, 2014). In the 1980s and 90s the 
Conservative government considered local government to be wasteful, excessively 
bureaucratic and acting in its own interests (Du Gay, 2000). Political autonomy was curtailed 
and funding was significantly reduced. Contracting out was imposed, decreasing the power of 
trade unions operative in the provision of local services (Brooke, 1991). There is a long history 
 
 
of the deployment of management techniques in local government encouraged by the 
requirements of central government in this period. In general terms, however, local 
government became increasingly associated with contracting out, the performance monitoring 
of contracted out services, deteriorating employment conditions and work intensification 
(Patterson and Pinch, 1995).  
‘New Labour’, coming to power in 1997, though hybrid in its programmatic ambitions for 
local government (Bevir, 2016), is commonly associated with the application of a more 
intensive management and monitoring regime. In particular, the system of audit and inspection 
associated with the Best Value programme was deployed to enhance quality and cost savings 
in the provision of local services (Power, 2004). This approach delimited autonomy for 
decision-making on the one hand and tied resource allocation to narrow dimensions of 
performance on the other. Contract-relations and budgetary accountability substituted direct 
managerial authority as a primary organising principle (Hebson et al., 2003).  
In the second decade of the 21st century, however, local government in the UK witnessed 
unprecedented public expenditure and employment cuts, compounding the struggle to meet 
the needs of local services (Newman, 2014). Following the formation of the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, the UK was subject to the most severe public 
spending cuts since the Second World War (Yeates et al., 2010). The coalition’s ‘Big Society’ 
programme, despite professing to ‘liberate’ communities and public service workers, 
emphasised a conservative communitarianism that sought to decentralise ‘duty and 
responsibility’ while radically reducing local government funding (HM Treasury, 2010b; 
Cameron, 2011).  
 
  
Yet, at the Labour controlled ‘Northern County’, whilst cost saving measures would certainly 
be made in the months that followed, there would be no simple acquiescence to the politics of 
austerity. Statements of policy at Northern County affirmed the need for “transformational 
change to the operating culture of the Council” (Northern County, 2010c). There was to be a 
new emphasis on the sharing of services, information sharing and collaborative working to 
address the root causes of social problems and to improve ‘customer’ service. If cuts were 
necessary, citizens were to have a greater say over how they were to be made and, ‘community’ 
would, it was claimed, be strengthened. Local business enterprise would be encouraged to 
promote growth for the jurisdiction and play a part in the ‘rebalancing’ of the local economy 
that would see a significant reduction in public sector employment (Northern County, 2010a).  
A strategic programme outlined changes to the management of the local authority. By early 
2011, a severance scheme was in place and voluntary redundancy was offered to local 
government workers who qualified. Identifying potential candidates for redundancy took 
place in combination with a broader restructuring programme. Permanent members of staff 
across the local authority were required to re-apply for their positions. The expectation was 
that remaining staff should become more ‘responsive’ to the needs of their clients by 
displaying ‘ownership’ of policies, programmes and projects. Corporate themes alluding to 
the heightening of individual responsibility were addressed in subtle terms in an interview 
with Julia, the Deputy Chief Executive. Staff should not simply take responsibility, they 
should also become proactive in relation to the needs of their clients.  As she stated, this was 
a matter of taking “initiative” and of being “flexible, responsive, customer focused”. 
These statements should be understood in the context of the changing priorities for local 
government associated with ‘New Labour’ during its final year in government, and in response 
to the repositioning of their opponents on the economy and ‘austerity’ (Seldon and Lodge, 
 
 
2010). Inspired by new thinking in local government, and given the support of both the UK 
Government’s Leadership Centre for Local Government and the Treasury’s Operational 
Efficiency Review (Grint and Holt, 2011), the ‘Total Place’ initiative sought to bring local 
authorities, their partners and local citizens together in an effort to align service provision with 
the needs of the local population. Notions of the horizontal ‘joining up’ of public service policy 
and provision inspired an array of interventions during the years of ‘New Labour’: measures 
to promote economy and efficiency, to tackle complex, ‘wicked’ and costly social problems 
in a system of government understood to have been fragmented by the Conservatives. The 
objective was to enhance ‘customer’ experience through more seamless and integrated 
systems, and to address the multiple economic, social and environmental conditions that may 
enhance the quality of existence in a place (Cowell and Martin, 2003; Downe and Martin, 
2006; Lyons, 2006). The report on the ‘Total Place’ pilot projects launched in 2009, in effect, 
gave a new salience and coherence to these diverse practices of ‘joining up’ (HM 
Treasury/Communities and Local Government, 2010), intimating a new way of framing the 
strategic ‘leadership’ role of local government, of renewing local democracy and supposedly 
enhancing local autonomy and choice. The ‘Total Place’ pilot projects, it was claimed, had 
shown what was possible with ‘strong and coordinated local leadership’. All public service 
providers in a local area, including third sector organisations, it was professed, could work 
more effectively together. The pilot projects had allowed for the identification of areas of 
overlap and duplication in back office and support functions, thereby promoting ‘efficiency’. 
They had allowed local partners to collocate services, to align budgets and implement joint 
outcomes with the aim of preventing difficult and costly social problems. The pilot projects 
had also included citizens in the collaborative planning of services to help to identify priorities 
and enhance ‘joined up’ service provision, emphasising the ‘customer’s’ point of view. The 
UK government budget statement of March 2010 (HM Treasury, 2010a) announced an array 
 
  
of measures in support of this ‘whole area’ approach to local government. Nevertheless, as the 
programmatic statement of the leaders of the Labour controlled Northern County in 2010 
confirmed, ‘Total Place’ survived the demise of ‘New Labour’ in May 2010. The expertise of 
project management was then considered to be an essential means to the accomplishment of 
Northern County’s objectives. 
 
Project management in the era of austerity 
Historically, the local authority as a whole had established its own PM methodology based 
on the government sponsored PRINCE2™ framework, first released through the UK Civil 
Service in 1996  (UK Cabinet Office, 2016). PRINCE2™ is an iteration of the project 
management method known as PRojects IN Controlled Environments (PRINCE), designed 
to separate projects into controlled stages while maintaining clear lines of accountability. 
Building on the earlier framework, PRINCE2 was conceived as a generic cross sector 
methodology, designed to be applicable to any project in the public or private sectors. At 
Northern County the goal had been to “standardise the basic processes of project 
management” (Northern County, 2009) in the aftermath of the establishment of the new 
unitary local authority in 2009, formed out of various district councils and the old county 
council. In taking PRINCE2™ as the norm, albeit adapted in the interests of simplicity and 
cost effectiveness, Northern County was following a familiar pattern in local government 
during the ‘New Labour’ years. During the 1990s the Improvement and Development 
Agency (IDeA), promoting ‘best practice’ and private/public partnerships, encouraged the 
development of this variant of project management expertise (de Groot, 2006). After 2003, 
efforts to enhance delivery and service procurement (Byatt, 2001) reinforced a new concern 
with the ‘capacity’ of local government. The joint LGA/Central Government Capacity 
Building initiative, supported by the inspection regime of the Audit Commission, further 
 
 
encouraged the advancement of PM expertise as PRINCE2™ became accepted ‘best 
practice’ (DCLG, 2008; Audit Commission, 2009). A host of experts and authorities thus 
championed a methodology that defined financial, quality and risk control throughout the 
project ‘lifecycle’ as a primary organisational competency (CCTA, 1997; OGC, 2009). The 
key priorities were the ‘continual business justification’ of programmes and projects, clear 
alignment with corporate objectives (OGC, 2009: 21-28) and due attention to ‘continuous 
improvement’ in the deployment of PM capabilities (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006). 
Following the news of substantial budget cuts in June 2010 (HM Treasury, 2010b) the local 
authority was seeking to expand the provision of PRINCE2™ training (for details on 
PRINCE2™ training see the chapter by Shaw et al in this volume).  For the ICT unit in 
particular there were additional pressures to expand provision. In late summer 2010, 
sanctioned and compiled by senior management, an independent assessment by a leading 
professional services firm criticised the ICT unit as lacking the necessary efficiency and 
effectiveness (Northern County, 2010b). A new investment programme was called for to 
install the technical infrastructure and encourage the necessary approach for the sharing of 
services, information sharing, project management and organising.  
Within the ICT unit further training in PRINCE2™ was offered at various levels of 
professional competence: ‘professional’, ‘practitioner’ and ‘foundational’. It was anticipated 
that a small team of contracted freelance consultant project managers in the Corporate 
Programme Office (PO), as agents of projectification, would provide the impetus for 
extending know how. In line with the local authority’s new competency programme, staff 
would be expected to adopt a proactive approach to project organising. It should become the 
norm, as one of our senior interviewees put it, that “we constantly reflect on all our actions 
and activities and become more self-aware” (Marcus, Authority Learning and Organisational 
 
  
Development Manager). Those experienced with PRINCE2™ at a higher level of proficiency 
would thus be encouraged to “champion” the technology as proactive educators. Change, in 
this view, was an “opportunity” for staff to learn best practice skills that would be needed, 
and a means for enhancing employability at a time of employment insecurity. The expectation 
was that staff, with expert guidance, would come to ‘embody’ the required practices such 
that little in the way of management would be required for the application of ‘joined up’ 
working and efficient and integrative systems in line with ‘Total Place’.   
Enacting project expertise “with intelligence” 
The PO had been set up as a physically isolated office space within which ICT programme 
activities were managed. Here the programme manager, Paula, oversaw freelance consultants 
and permanent project managers authorising and overseeing projects. The freelance 
consultants were agency personnel brought in on six monthly contracts to encourage the 
required approach to projects and support programme activities. They had significant 
experience in PM and PRINCE2™ through delivering ICT change projects and management 
consultancy work in both private and public sectors. Some members of the PO group were 
also associated with the UK (APM) and US professional associations (PMI). Paula oversaw 
the process using a portfolio manager, making visible and reportable work activity within a 
PRINCE2™ framework. The status of all projects in the department were thus mapped 
through a ‘RAG’ (red, amber, green) projection, resembling the traffic light system favoured 
by the UK Government’s Office of Government Commerce (Bourn, 2004: 6) throughout the 
project lifecycle. Half hour project meetings took place weekly at which time the freelancers 
reviewed the RAG status of each project with senior managers.  
 
Encountering these expert freelance consultants in the early stages of the change programme, 
we found them to be advocates of a know-how intended to ‘empower’ others to govern 
 
 
themselves. These subjects assumed no requirement for high level proficiency among the 
targets of their intervention. Rather, a lower level of “awareness” of PM’s underlying 
principles was expected. In the discourse of “awareness” phrases such as “always get sign 
off”, “flag waving”, “auditability of the project” and “the only thing that matters is getting 
the job done” appeared to constitute fundamental rules of engagement. Above all there was 
an obligation to document and inscribe every decision and every action taken. Paula, for 
example, reiterated the PM canon of “completed as defined” when asked to define what she 
meant by ‘success’. Another, Darren, repeatedly used the terminology of putting “walls” 
around a project.  
Nonetheless, for the freelance consultants governing through “awareness” was construed as 
different in kind from the true nature of PM expertise. They described their professional 
histories in the private sector as management consultants, project managers and ICT 
managers as constitutive of their professional practice and self-understanding. These subjects 
framed their relationship to projects in terms of “ownership”, denoting the achievement of 
personal goals and an expertise only available to the experienced practitioner.  As evidenced 
in both the interviews and project meetings we attended, project “ownership” extended to 
identifying strategic targets among organisational actors proactively, with a view to building 
a community of interest.  Acting to secure this community meant that one must actively 
campaign to achieve the PM canon of stakeholder “buy in”.  
The tactical character of these practices was something that these freelance consultant project 
managers identified with in their work and life. Paula, for example, described a fusion of 
personal and work relationships as business like conversations, where it becomes “hard to 
get out of the mode of ‘what can I get out of this? what is at stake here?”. They appeared to 
‘own’ their projects to the point at which they would deploy combative mechanisms to secure 
 
  
and protect delivery. Suggesting an expertise without formal programmatic status, to ‘own’ 
a project was ultimately to manipulate its course in accordance with appropriate, “intelligent” 
tactics of alliance building. 
As custodians of expertise, the freelance consultants appeared to envision themselves as 
being at odds with their senior sponsors at Northern County. Paula, for example, commented 
that senior managers felt threatened by her professionalism. These subjects tended to query 
the use of PRINCE2™ in the public sector as “used simply as a process”, as contrasted with 
their own practice of “using PRINCE2™ with intelligence”. Though there were few 
indications of outright contestation, the difficulties that local government staff were 
experiencing in adapting to their new project roles early in the programme, and demonstrating 
‘responsiveness’, was a theme to which the consultants often returned. As one of our 
interviewees, Theo, commented whilst indicating that he was viewed as a threat by ICT 
project staff: “They [ICT project staff] seem to tolerate a lack of progress. . . There is no 
traction on projects. . . they just seem to live with it. . . ‘if we [freelance consultants] can get 
you [ICT staff] doing your projects better, you are more likely to be retained than released”.  
The identities of the freelance project experts 
Though working lives were reported as intensive, involving long hours and regularly 
responding to emergencies, all the freelance project managers we interviewed generally 
judged freelance project work to be a ‘solution’ through which one could learn to manage 
better, earn more, and lead a more satisfying life. Satisfaction for all the freelancers derived 
in part from a pastoral and supportive relationship with those who were understood to lack 
PM expertise at the local authority. These subjects were concerned to frame their work as a 
matter of caring for others, with their best interests and wellbeing in view. John, one of the 
freelance project managers in the Corporate Programme Office, explained in an interview 
 
 
that his care for others meant that staff “have a much better ability to see what is coming over 
the horizon”.  
In a distinctive way, life was addressed by these freelance project experts as something of a 
project in itself. In such instances the potential application of PM’s processes of 
rationalisation, such as in the “risk management” of one’s career, were seemingly 
‘empowering’ and ‘productive’. In the case of John, making himself up as a freelance project 
manager relied on a discourse of self-actualisation. His own career was addressed as an 
adventurous journey and a vehicle for continual learning. As he stated, “there must be certain 
character traits that make a contractor.  I was always left alone to do my own thing, so was 
everyone I know who was successful that I went to school with. . . I had a completely different 
upbringing to the kids I hung around with”.  
Similarly, Darren described his work as a means to actively care for and generate respect for 
himself through continually changing and developing. Notable in this case was an account of 
more intimate personal relationships, articulated as coming second to his working life. It was 
“fickle, enjoyable relationships” that took precedence from this perspective. Furthermore, 
despite sympathising with the plight of staff at Northern County, vulnerable at the early 
stages of a restructuring programme, Darren constructed an identity in opposition to the 
working culture at the local authority and in response to what he judged to be an insensitivity 
towards the sovereign customer: “You’ve got a culture that is being indoctrinated, to protect 
your job, protect your pension, protect everything around you. And the customer?. . . You 
kind of wonder, well, why are you there to do that job?”  
Notions of giving all of oneself, and then “grieving” for a project on its completion were also 
evident, calling upon discourses of self-realisation as projects were posed as all-
 
  
encompassing personal experiences. These themes would be emphasised further as ideas of 
independence were linked to continual stimulation and learning in project work. As Paula 
reflected: “Oh, it’s quite interesting, ‘cause I’ve been doing an operational role for the last 18 
months.  And we came to a major milestone. . .I walked into the office, day one, and thought, 
‘Okay, what do I do now?’ Cause I’d delivered my work, you know? My project is now 
finished, even though I was in an operational role that goes on for the next 30 years, my brain 
says, ‘I’ve now delivered my project.  What do I do now?’  So, I resigned”.  
Ambivalence and insecurity – the experience of local authority staff  
The targets of the change programme were local government managers and lower level 
administrators set apart from the corporate programme office and increasingly involved in 
project work within a PRINCE2™ framework. The majority had been trained formally in 
PRINCE2™. Most had already experienced significant upheaval with the formation of a 
unitary Northern County in 2009. Amidst organisational restructuring, with budget and staff 
reductions, the 15 permanent employees that we interviewed found various ways to critique, 
or more exactly ‘distance’ themselves, from the objectives of the local authority programme.     
On the one hand, the restructuring process could be experienced as an administrative 
inquisition. Northern County, as one permanent project manager Philip argued, was seeking 
to determine ‘who he was’ by having his whole career “boiled down” to “saying the right 
thing in an interview”. The favoured project measures of work and performance at Northern 
County for Philip, in effect, undermined the meaningfulness of working relationships, 
ignoring an established professional self. Brad, on the other hand, a permanent project 
manager, described a mode of professional conduct that emphasised the importance of tacit 
organisational knowledge. Knowledge of a more localised and reflexive kind was being 
devalued through the requirement to produce accountable project management truths.  
 
 
 
In a related way, others bemoaned the need for the evaluation of projects in meetings and 
through the continuous updating of documentation. As one project manager, Jennifer, put it: 
“I’ve got better things to do than come and sit in and discuss what is right and what is wrong 
with projects”.  Similarly, Simon, an administrator, stated: “There are less people to do the 
work and we’ve still got work outside of project work, a lot of work, you know?”. At times, 
critiques developed by local government staff shaded into a broader anti-professional 
critique. “For me”, as Jennifer put it during a discussion on PM methodology updates, “it is 
just a way for them [i.e. the project management professional associations] to make money. 
I understand it [PM methodology], but the thing is, I don’t need a bit of paper to tell me”. 
The recurring theme of professional self-interest was taken up by another manager, Eric. 
There was “an industry around it” he claimed. Here, a critique is advanced from the point of 
view of both the consequences of PM for work intensification and the superfluity of its 
expertise in fulfilling the real responsibilities of local government work. This mode of 
argument emphasises the self-serving activity of professional groupings through PM 
associations. 
At other times, project managers and their lower level colleagues queried the programme less 
from the point of its questionable professional ambitions, and more in regard to the 
recruitment of highly paid freelance consultants. This concern related not only to the effects 
upon their own employment insecurity, but also a more general disquiet about the outsourcing 
of expert labour. At these moments, participants placed an emphasis on the worth, capabilities 
and skills of local government workers, as those capable of carrying out the work involved 
in the investment programme themselves, and as those who should be provided with the 
capabilities to do so. According to Tina, a permanent project manager, a lack of ‘investment’ 
in the workforce at the local authority meant that personal development had been neglected. 
 
  
She questioned the procurement of contracted expertise: “We should have the skills in-house 
to do that work [the ICT investment programme], and if we haven’t then why haven’t we?. . 
.I mean, I do think they [freelance consultants] can bring a lot of experience, and they can 
bring knowledge of what has happened in outside areas, but in terms of council workers, it’s 
like ‘my job is on the line and you are paying how much for a contractor? That is like three 
years of my salary!’” 
Statements of this kind appeared to be encouraged by the local government trade union. 
During our time at the authority the union was encouraging members to question the 
irrevocability of their situation and to act to avert the privatisation of labour and services.  A 
key approach in this sense was its campaign to keep services in-house. Trade union 
documentation argued that staff were “the real experts” (Unison, 2012: 13) and should act to 
ensure their full involvement in programmes that might otherwise involve over-charging by 
consultants, resulting in substantial waste and the possibility of substandard service 
provision.  Through this discourse the trade union posed an image of local government 
workers as ‘cost effective’ experts in their own right.  
 
On ‘the tactics of the weak’ 
Yet notwithstanding the various critiques and arguments discussed above, there were few 
indications of a desire for practical refusal. Jennifer, for example, deeply ambivalent, both 
attracted to the union discourse and sceptical of the claims of PM expertise, could 
nevertheless see benefit in PM as a way to realise autonomy in the labour market and end a 
working relationship that had become difficult and instrumental. This process in her case 
undermined a sense of collective identification with her colleagues but enabled her to foresee 
an alternative means of achieving a sense of ‘freedom’ in her working life, of doing: 
 
 
“something independent, go off and do something different, or even take it [PM] somewhere 
else”. 
 
Others discussed the advantages of PM knowledge and practice less as a means of realising 
their ‘human capital’, and more as a way of achieving safety and security at a time of crisis. 
In this respect, Harry, an ICT staff member with over twenty years of local government 
experience, described his hopes in using PM. In this case the benefits of expertise in an 
internal interdepartmental struggle were foregrounded; “Well, hopefully they’ll [senior 
management, other departments in the council] see more of what we’re doing”. Making 
oneself and one’s department visible and accountable through PM is addressed here as a way 
to demonstrate to others that both he and his department are performing (“they might see our 
worth a little bit more”). This argument is framed as a critique of having been left outside a 
formal network of accountability. Yet ultimately, there is an alignment between the 
judgements of a local actor and a broader governmental regime.  
 
Another ICT staff member, Robert, with over twelve years of local government experience, 
explained his hopes in a similar way. As he put it: “I think it’s easier to show the management 
what we actually do (by using PRINCE2™)”. As the ICT unit’s role in cost reduction across 
the authority took effect and became known, the defensive appeal of PM knowledge and 
practice was considerable for these subjects. Security became a matter of personal and 
departmental concern, so much so that these self-governing subjects appeared willing to abide 
by the ‘rules of the game’. A related point was taken up by another of our subjects as he 
described a particular form of ‘empowerment’. The ‘liberating’ aspect of PM’s governmental 
rationality would, Eric believed, provide a platform from which to state his case to his superiors. 
He would, as a manager, be better placed to proactively justify the economic rationale for the 
 
  
continuation of the IT department’s work through the means of PM knowledge and practice, 
thus promoting the security of his own and his colleague’s future employment. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Munro (2012), adapting Dean (1999), characterises PM as a technology of agency and 
performance, one of an array of contemporary management techniques of government 
designed to guide apparently autonomous or free actors towards the achievement of specified 
ends. As such, the freelance purveyors of PM expertise under examination in our case can be 
conceived of as agents of governmentality. Contextualising their intervention in a field of 
power relations, the era of austerity and efforts by an array of authorities to normalise PM 
expertise in UK local government, our analysis of these essentially entrepreneurial 
consultants suggests they had found a means of self-expression in a working life akin to 
Handy’s (1991) vision of the portfolio career. As PM, with its identity affirming images, 
interpellates or successfully hails these entrepreneurial subjects, a relay is established 
between the aspirations of governing authorities and a particular local field of power 
relations, echoing arguments elsewhere in this volume (see chapters by Buttner and Leopold 
and Shaw et al). In this respect we would suggest a kind of pastoral logic (Foucault, 1978) in 
the way participants commonly described the deployment of project expertise as a matter of 
caring for others, implying a shepherding of the ‘flock’ towards a new understanding with 
their best interests and well-being in view. This pastoral manner, which has been used by 
others to frame the practice of clinical leaders in the reform of the UK Health Service (Ferlie 
et al., 2013; Waring and Martin, 2016), would thus seem to have a wider applicability.  
At the same time, for our freelance consultants projects also possessed an ‘expressive’ 
character. These subjects framed their relationship to projects in terms of notions of 
 
 
‘ownership’, implying the achievement of personal goals and a kind of ‘between us’ expertise 
only available to the experienced practitioner. PM possessed a powerful, identity affirming 
character, an appropriate, and even ideal career outlet for the ‘freedom loving’ consultant. 
Although working lives were conveyed as demanding, involving responses to crises (Eaton 
and Bailyn, 2000; Packendorff, 2002) and ‘bereavement’ upon the completion of projects, 
projects were also judged a ‘solution’ through which one could accumulate wealth and lead 
a more fulfilling life (Clegg and Courpasson, 2004; Muzio et al., 2011). The career was 
indeed, it seemed, a project of the self (Grey, 1994). Yet transcending Grey’s concept of life 
subordinated to the career principle, for these subjects, notions and practices associated with 
PM expertise provided a framework through which other non-working aspects of life could 
be framed. ‘Private’ norms of calculation and aspiration could be realised, where life itself, 
at least for some of our subjects, was amenable to project management. In such instances the 
potential application of PM’s processes of rationalisation were indeed wide ranging, 
‘enabling’ and ‘productive’.  
Pursuing a critical Foucauldian analytic further (Barratt, 2008), how might we assess the costs 
of the case we have been considering? We would argue that ‘Total Place’, which PM was 
designed to support in our study of a local authority, should not be viewed as merely another 
attempt to make political institutions function in a ‘quasi-business’ manner (Diefenbach, 
2009: 893). Alongside efficient and effective government, the supposed enhancement of 
‘community’, ‘partnership’, ‘resilience’ and, perhaps most of all, democracy, were also 
crucial objectives. Undoubtedly parochial in its sense of ‘place’, indifferent to the global 
institutions and forces that seek to govern ‘places’, and overly submissive to the economics 
of austerity (McKinnon, 2016), Total Place should not be diagnosed as simply another 
manifestation of a ‘neoliberal rationality’ of government (Bevir, 2016).  
 
  
PM, then, in this case is implicated in a hybrid scheme of government (Newman, 2005; 
Bejerot and Hasselbladh, 2011). For us, it is the tensions and contradictions of this specific 
hybrid scheme that are most striking. The stated ends of the expert freelancers suggest an 
orientation at odds with other objectives of ‘Total Place', notably the enhancement of 
supposedly democratic ends. To imagine oneself in a relation of ‘ownership’ to one’s work 
is to undermine the core principle of political accountability. Notions of ‘public service’ and 
‘public accountability’ were noticeably absent in the discourse of our consultant subjects. 
Ultimately their practice evokes the ‘managerial stratum’ characterised by Hirst (1996): 
members of a group, relatively homogeneous in attitudes, aspirations and working methods, 
readily moving between public and private sectors. The manner in which such work devalues 
and undermines the ethics and practices of public institutions, poses a profound threat to 
democratic ends.  
The prospect of the extension and institutionalisation of PM expertise within the framework 
of Total Place and planned by the local authority, came with further contradictions and 
tensions. As such, the technology of PM is vulnerable to an array of criticisms of the 
deployment of management methods in the public sector (Du Gay, 2000). When the activities 
of local government are redefined in terms of the specification of ‘outputs’ encapsulated in 
performance indicators, projects and contracts (Power, 1994) there is not only a weakening 
of local political accountability but a delegitimisation of public provision (Newman, 2014). 
In project based organising local government officers are assigned powers disproportionately 
in practices which ‘empower’ them. As the work of government is redefined in managerial 
terms, bureaucratic ideals of impartiality and integrity associated with the defence of the 
public interest in a democratic polity are undermined (Du Gay, 2000). When the work of 
government is conceived in large part as an expert, technical and managerial activity, the 
 
 
space for the practice of democratic citizenship and political engagement contracts (Brown, 
2015).  
As we have seen, however, efforts to enhance PM expertise among local government workers 
engaged in project based work were not unproblematic. The early stages of the new initiative 
saw its targets identifying ways to rebuff and critique, or more exactly ‘distance’ themselves 
from governmental discourses. For many there was another side to the new performance 
requirements, with permanent project managers and staff at the authority bemoaning the 
continuous inscribing of project activities. There were material concerns at stake, in a context 
of restructuring and the performance of additional project related work. Perhaps most 
common of all was the problem of the devaluation of local knowledge. Notions of tacit 
knowledge embedded in the working environment, evoking Michael Polanyi’s (Polanyi, 
1958; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) concept of ‘personal knowledge’, implied certain 
inherent limitations to the knowledge of external experts. In other instances, PM expertise 
was contested in the name of values and practices associated with the advancement of the 
public interest (Osborne, 1994; Du Gay, 2000; Barratt, 2009). This argument could be 
extended into a broader critique of the self-serving goals of PM as a profession, evoking 
neoliberal critiques of the pursuit of monopoly rents by professional bodies (Leicht and 
Lyman, 2006). 
Nevertheless, for all the rebuffing, the logic of PM pervaded the discourse of local 
government workers. In this respect, our study suggests once again an array of perhaps more 
surprising ‘productive’ effects. For some disenfranchised local government staff, PM 
expertise for all its weaknesses, was viewed as a standardised and reproducible form of 
‘human capital’ (Clegg and Courpasson, 2004; Weiskopf and Munro, 2012), offering a ‘way 
out’ of the authority at a time of considerable turbulence and insecurity. Most common of all, 
 
  
however, was the tactical use for PM expertise. It was not PM’s ‘liberating potential’ or the 
more intimate rewards of project (or contract) ‘success’ and ‘delivery’ that was at stake. 
Rather PM became seductive and necessary as a ‘defensive’ resource, for demonstrating 
personal and departmental achievements, thus protecting employment at a time of insecurity. 
We have illustrated a mode of ‘resistance’, a tactical reversal (Foucault, 1978) or a turning 
around of instruments of power (de Certeau, 1984).  Critics argue (Rose, 1999) that subjects 
of government who are granted responsible autonomy, are increasingly required to act 
according to a ‘litigious mentality’ in order to defend and justify their value and existence. 
Employees, whilst seeming to rebuff some of the effects of governmental discourses still, 
ultimately, reproduced them in a variety of ways. Fleming and Spicer (2003) have argued for 
the need to document the many different forms that ‘dis-identification’ can take in 
contemporary organisations: the moments at which organisational actors abjure dominant 
discourses, only to reaffirm them in their actions. Dis-identifications in our case took diverse 
forms: in the expression of distrust for managers and their schemes, the professions, or indeed 
in a commitment to local knowledge and the customary values and practices of local 
government work.  
Albeit in different ways, then, it is the expertise of PM that subjects look to for a way out of 
their predicament. Such ‘resistance’ had little to do with efforts to overturn the influence of 
PM expertise, or even active support for the union, let alone the defence of local government 
as a ‘strategic’ site for vital conditions that enable autonomy, solidarity and citizenship 
(Newman, 2014). Indeed, in so far as they appear to set members of departments and 
individuals against one another in a competitive game such resistance appears to us especially 
divisive. We should look elsewhere for the possibility of effective forms of resistance to the 
shattering of local government, perhaps to those movements of the left debating the question 
 
 
of the organisation of the State (e.g. Shah and Goss, 2007) or the alliances of public sector 
trade unionists and activists that have emerged in response to austerity.  
Finally, should we take the ubiquity of ‘projects’ in our study as a sign of the ‘projectification’ 
of society, a concept favoured by some critics to capture wide ranging changes in society 
informed by project based concepts (Lundin and Soderholm, 1998)? After Foucault 
(Foucault, 1991; Dean, 1994) we remain suspicious of any global and epochal sociological 
diagnosis, with its implicit assumption of a unifying principle of social organisation and mode 
of argument that leaves little sense of a ‘way out’. Ultimately our study of agents of 
projectification and the consequences of their intervention in a hybrid scheme of rule has 
sought to achieve a more modest ambition: to diagnose the effects of the deployment of a 
prevalent form of management expertise in a specific, endangered institutional setting. 
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